Jailbreak by Humanizing LLMs

Paper Reading in SMLR

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Paper Info

- **Paper:** How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMs[1]
- **Institution:** Virginia Tech, Renmin University of China, UC Davis, Stanford University
- **Co-First Author:** Yi Zeng, Hongpeng Lin
- **Webpage:** `https://chats-lab.github.io/persuasive_jailbreaker`
- **GitHub Repo:** `https://github.com/CHATS-lab/persuasive_jailbreaker`

Author Track

(1) Yi and Hongpeng samely attained B.S. in Xidian.
(2) Diyi Yang is fourth author but doesn't co-supervise the project.
(3) The corresponding author Weiyan Shi was a Postdoc at Stanford NLP, working with Diyi Yang, and now is a new AP in Northeastern University.

Paper Info

- **Paper:** How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMs[1]
- **Article Structure:**
  - Attack methodology
    - Persuasion Taxonomy:40 techniques into 15 strategies
    - Persuasive Adversarial Prompt (PAP)
  - Result

    How (1)Benchmark: GPT-4 crafts; (2)Metric: GPT-4 Judge[2]

    What (1)Broad Scan; (2)Iterative Probe
  - Defense
    - Re-evaluating Existing Defenses
    - Exploring Adaptive Defenses
- **Why this paper?** Novel jailbreaking methodology. The direction of humanizing is more sensible and practical in LLM era.

Johnny?

- What does it mean?

Johnny?

1 Basic Information

- What does it mean?



Figure: *Johnny* is a slang

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2 Introduction

Background

🥳 Significant advancements in LLMs mark a leap forward in AI.

😈 However, it remains challenging to safely integrate these models into the real world.

[1] Include learning from successful manually-crafted jailbreak templates and in-context examples.

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AI safety research focused on **algorithmic jailbreak methods**

- Optimization-based
- Side-channel-based
- Distribution-based[1]

Question

Why is it called *distribution-based*?

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Question

Why is it called *distribution-based*?

Main question: Overlook risks involved in natural and human-like communication with millions of non-expert users.

[1] Include learning from successful manually-crafted jailbreak templates and in-context examples.

Background

Persuasion is ubiquitous in everyday communication.

The well-known ”grandma exploit”[2] is an example.



Figure: Grandma Exploit Example

[2] https://www.reddit.com/r/ChatGPT/comments/12sn0kk/grandma_exploit



Figure: This method achieves an attack success rate of over 92% on Llama-2, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4 *without specialized optimization*.

1. Propose a persuasion taxonomy with persuasion techniques.
2. Apply it to automatically paraphrase plain harmful queries into human-readable persuasive adversarial prompts (PAP).

Summary of **contributions**.

1. **Persuasion Taxonomy**: first introduce a persuasion technique taxonomy.

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4. **In-depth Iterative Probe**: fine-tune a more targeted *Persuasive Paraphraser*, and iteratively apply different persuasion techniques to generate PAP.

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5. **Defense Analysis**: evaluate recent post-hoc defenses.

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5. **Defense Analysis**: evaluate recent post-hoc defenses.
6. **Defense Exploration**: propose three adaptive defenses.

Related Work

2 Introduction



Figure: Comparison of previous adversarial prompts and PAP

1. **Algorithmic systems**: GCG, low-resource languages methods
2. **Instruction followers**: unconventional instruction like virtualization or role-play
3. **Human-like communicators**: interpretable Persuasive Adversarial Prompts (PAP)

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Taxonomy

Across psychology, communication, sociology, marketing, and NLP.

	Strategy (13)	Persuasion Technique (40)					
Ethical	*Information-based*	1.	Evidence-based Persuasion	2.	Logical Appeal		
	Credibility-based	3.	Expert Endorsement	4.	Non-expert Testimonial	5.	Authority Endorsement
	Norm-based	6.	Social Proof	7.	Injunctive Norm		
	Commitment-based	8.	Foot-in-the-door	9.	Door-in-the-face	10.	Public Commitment
	Relationship-based	11.	Alliance Building	12.	Complimenting	13.	Shared Values
		14.	Relationship Leverage	15.	Loyalty Appeals		
	Exchange-based	16.	Favor	17.	Negotiation		
	Appraisal-based	18.	Encouragement	19.	Affirmation		
	Emotion-based	20.	Positive Emotional Appeal	21.	Negative Emotional Appeal	22.	Storytelling
	Information Bias	23.	Anchoring	24.	Priming	25.	Framing
		26.	Confirmation Bias				
	Linguistics-based	27.	Reciprocity	28.	Compensation		
	Scarcity-based	29.	Supply Scarcity	30.	Time Pressure		
	Reflection-based	31.	Reflective Thinking				
Unethical	*Threat*	32.	Threats				
	Deception	33.	False Promises	34.	Misrepresentation	35.	False Information
	Social Sabotage	36.	Rumors	37.	Social Punishment	38.	Creating Dependency
		39.	Exploiting Weakness	40.	Discouragement		

Figure: A systematic taxonomy of persuasion techniques[3]

[3] Typo for *13*. Having checked with author.

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Persuasive Adversarial Prompt (PAP)

A. Persuasive Paraphraser Training

1. **Step 1:** obtain training data.
2. **Step 2:** use the training data to fine-tune a persuasive paraphraser.

B. Persuasive Paraphraser Deployment

1. **Step 1:** use the fine-tuned persuasive paraphraser to generate PAP for new harmful queries.
2. **Step 2:** use a GPT4-Judge to evaluate the harmfulness.



Figure: Overview of the taxonomy-guided Persuasive Adversarial Prompt (PAP) generation method

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First is about *how*.

- **Target model**: GPT-3.5 (gpt-3.5-turbo-0613) as the target model.
- **Benchmark**: At the time of experiments, there was no publicly available benchmark with well-categorized harmful queries.
- **Metrics**: *PAP Success Ratio*, the percentage of PAPs that lead to outputs with the highest harmfulness score of 5 per GPT-4 Judge.

$$\textit{PAP Success Ratio} = \frac{\text{\# successful PAP (in one risk category)}}{\text{\# total PAP (in one risk category)}} \tag{1}$$

Results

4 Results

Then is about *what*. Introduce in oral.



Figure: Broad scan results on GPT-3.5 over OpenAI's 14 risk categories.

In-depth Iterative Probing Results

- Stronger models may be more vulnerable to PAPs than weaker models if the model family is susceptible to persuasion.
- The overall ASR varies for different model families: PAP achieves 92% ASR on Llama-2 and GPTs but is limited on Claude.

$$\textit{Attack Success Rate}(\mathbf{ASR}) = \frac{\#\ \text{jailbroken harmful queries}}{\#\ \text{total harmful queries}} \tag{2}$$



Figure: PAPs' Efficacy Across Trials

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Existing Defenses

Revisits general defense strategies that **do not modify** the base model or its initial settings.

- **Mutation-based**: Alter inputs to reduce harm. Specifically **Rephrase** and **Retokenize**.

[4] A little bit similar to *dropout*, which prevents overfitting in the training stage.

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  - **Rand-Insert**, **Rand-Swap**, and **Rand-Patch**: Alter the inputs and inspects the change in outputs.
- ~~**Perplexity-based**~~: Since PAPs are coherent and exhibit low perplexity.

[4] A little bit similar to *dropout*, which prevents overfitting in the training stage.

Existing Defenses

1. No Claude models since they are already robust to PAP.

Defenses	ASR (↓)		
	@Llama-2	@GPT-3.5	@GPT-4
No defense	92%	94%	92%
Mutation-based			
Rephrase	34% (-58)	58% (**-36**)	60% (**-32**)
Retokenize	24% (**-68**)	62% (-32)	76% (-16)
Detection-based			
Rand-Drop	82% (-10)	84% (-10)	80% (-12)
RAIN	60% (-32)	70% (-24)	88% (-4)
Rand-Insert	92% (-0)	88% (-6)	86% (-6)
Rand-Swap	92% (-0)	76% (-18)	80% (-12)
Rand-Patch	92% (-0)	86% (-8)	84% (-8)

Figure: ASR of PAPs (10 trials) after representative defenses

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4. **The more advanced the models are, the less effective current defenses are.**

Defenses	**ASR (↓)**		
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Exploring Adaptive Defenses

Premise: simply removing all persuasive contents may adversely affect the LLM utility.
Investigate two straightforward and intuitive adaptive defense tactics

- **Adaptive System Prompt**
- **Targeted Summarization**

Explore three adaptive defenses within these two tactics:

1. **Adaptive System Prompt**: A system prompt to instruct the LLM to resist persuasion explicitly.

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2. **Base Summarizer**: Prompt GPT-4 to summarize before executing the input via the target LLM.

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1. **Adaptive System Prompt**: A system prompt to instruct the LLM to resist persuasion explicitly.
2. **Base Summarizer**: Prompt GPT-4 to summarize before executing the input via the target LLM.
3. **Tuned Summarizer**: Fine-tune a GPT-3.5-based summarizer.

Exploring Adaptive Defenses

1. Impact on model utility is measured by the MT-bench score.

	ASR (↓)			MT-bench (↑)
	@Llama-2	@GPT-3.5	@GPT-4	@GPT-4
No Defense				
PAPs	92%	94%	92%	8.97
Paraphrase				
PAPs	34% (-58)	58% (-36)	60% (-32)	7.99
Retokenize				
PAPs	24% (-68)	62% (-32)	76% (-16)	8.75
Adapt Sys.				**8.85**
PAPs	30% (-62)	12% (-82)	38% (-54)	
PAIR	14% (-16)	0% (**-42**)	14% (-40)	
GCG	4% (-12)	0% (**-86**)	0% (-0)	
Base Smry.				6.51
PAPs	22% (-70)	42% (-52)	46% (-46)	
PAIR	4% (-26)	8% (-34)	20% (-34)	
GCG	0% (-16)	8% (-78)	0% (-0)	
Tuned Smry.				6.65
PAPs	2% (**-90**)	4% (**-90**)	2% (**-90**)	
PAIR	0% (**-30**)	6% (-36)	6% (**-48**)	
GCG	2% (**-14**)	8% (-78)	0% (-0)	

Figure: Defenses results against various attacks

[5] Any questions here?

Exploring Adaptive Defenses

1. Impact on model utility is measured by the MT-bench score.
2. **More interestingly, adaptive defenses, initially tailored for PAPs, are also effective against other types of adversarial prompts.**[5]

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6 Reproduction

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- For safety concerns, repository only release the persuasion taxonomy and the code for in-context sampling described in paper.
- For safety studies, researchers can apply through this Google Form[6].
- The repo only discloses two useful files:
  - `incontext_sampling_example.ipynb`
  - `persuasion_taxonomy.jsonl`

[6] `https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSee-Kf4xrYHipZSjOImAW41VhcVcqmzc1MBo5XOYW7TrQ_9CQ/viewform`, still on applying :(

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- **Current Question**: API doesn't have the access of GPT-4?

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Appendix: Fine-tuning Aligned Language Models Compromises Safety



Figure: Main Result in [2]



0.2美元微调就能让ChatGPT彻底破防！普林斯顿、斯坦福发布LLM风险预警：普通用户微调也影响LLM安全性

新智元 新智元 2023-10-13 13:08 北京

新智元报道

编辑：LRS

【新智元导读】微调LLM需谨慎，用良性数据、微调后角色扮演等都会破坏LLM对齐性能！学习调大了还会继续提高风险！

虽说预训练语言模型可以在零样本（zero-shot）设置下，对新任务实现非常好的泛化性能，但在现实应用时，往往还需要针对特定用例对模型进行微调。

不过，微调后的模型安全性如何？是否会遗忘之前接受的对齐训练吗？面向用户时是否会输出有害内容？

Figure: WeChat Post

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8 References

- Y. Zeng, H. Lin, J. Zhang, D. Yang, R. Jia, and W. Shi, "How johnny can persuade llms to jailbreak them: Rethinking persuasion to challenge ai safety by humanizing llms," arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.06373, 2024.
- X. Qi, Y. Zeng, T. Xie, P.-Y. Chen, R. Jia, P. Mittal, and P. Henderson, "Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to!" arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.03693, 2023.

Jailbreak by Humanizing LLMs

Thank you for listening!
Any questions?